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reduced CIP deviations at this time. Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,
uncertainty about counterparty risk became a significant determinant of CIP deviations,
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that owes partly to lack of capital and partly to heightened counterparty credit risk.
Central bank interventions helped reduce the funding liquidity risk of global institutions.
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1 
The covered interest rate parity (CIP) relation is a bedrock of international economics.  CIP 
states that an investor should be indifferent between borrowing and lending at domestic or 
foreign interest rates if the foreign exchange (FX) risk is fully hedged.  Empirical evidence is 
generally supportive of the CIP, especially for recent sample periods and for the developed 
countries, except when exchange controls impede the free flow of capital.
1
In this paper, we document a substantial and persistent breakdown in the CIP relation 
since the onset of the crisis in August 2007.  Specifically, we measure the deviation from CIP by 
the US dollar (USD) basis, defined as the difference between the dollar rate implied by the CIP 
relation (henceforth, the “implied rate”) and a benchmark unsecured dollar interest rate (e.g. the 
USD LIBOR).  We show that while the basis is miniscule in normal periods, it has been 
consistently large and positive since the start of the crisis and increased dramatically after mid-
September 2008 following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Figure 1).  For example, the 
basis estimated using USD LIBOR as the interest rate and the euro-USD currency rate increased 
from essentially zero in the pre-crisis period to around 25 basis points during the initial periods 
of the crisis, before shooting up to over 200 basis points by the end of September 2008. 
  Observed CIP 
deviations tend to be short-lived (11 minutes or less) and are not, on average, profit making 
(Akram, Rime and Sarno (2008)).   
We show that this result is robust to the use of alternative USD interest rates and the use 
of different currency pairs of USD vis-à-vis other currencies.  If banks contributing to LIBOR 
were strategically under-reporting their true dollar borrowing rates during the crisis, as has been 
alleged, then we might spuriously observe a deviation from CIP.
2
                                                 
1 Holmes and Schott (1965) discuss how severe exchange control restrictions resulted in persistent CIP deviations 
during the early 1930s to the late 1950s.  As these controls eased, CIP deviations became less frequent. 
  However, we continue to find 
2 See, for example, “Libor Fog,” by Carrick Mollenkamp, The Wall Street Journal, April 16 2008, page A1.  
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large deviations from CIP when we use the New York Funding Rate (NYFR) and Treasury bill 
rates.
3
We further find that CIP deviations are robust to considerations of transactions costs.  We 
incorporate the bid-ask spread for the four legs of the arbitrage transaction: forward, spot, dollar 
and the non-dollar rates.  As the bid-ask spread in all markets blew up during the crisis the 
magnitude of CIP deviations is reduced after accounting for the spread.  However, we continue 
to observe a large increase in the basis relative to its pre-crisis level before the Lehman failure, 
with a more dramatic jump afterwards.  
  We also find that the dollar basis estimated with respect to six currency pairs (USD vis-à-
vis the Australian dollar, the euro, the Japanese Yen, the British pound, the Swiss franc, and the 
New Zealand dollar) shows a similar pattern of sharp increases in the crisis period, and 
especially since September 2008. 
What may have caused this remarkable deviation in the CIP?  Keynes (1923) discusses 
how lack of “floating capital” may impede the CIP relation from holding.  In modern parlance, 
funding constraints during the crisis placed limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Geanakoplos (2003), Basak and Croitoru (2006), and Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2009)).
4
                                                 
3 NYFR, published by ICAP and introduced in June 2008, is a trimmed mean of quotes collected from a panel of 
contributing US banks.  To reduce the incentive to under-report, individual quotes and the composition of the panel 
are not disclosed.  And, while Libor panel banks are asked to provide an estimate of their own borrowing costs, 
ICAP asks only for an estimate of the rate at which a representative A1/P1 bank would be likely to obtain funding. 
  Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) develop an asset pricing model where 
risk-tolerant investors are margin constrained but risk-averse investors are not.  They show that, 
if risk-averse investors are also constrained in their derivatives positions, then the basis between 
4 Holmes and Schott (1965) provide examples where increases in the flow of arbitrage funds were associated with 
decreases in CIP deviations.  In the context of the uncovered interest rate parity, Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen 
(2008) document that the sudden unwinding of carry trades are attributable to funding illiquidity when speculators 
near funding constraints.    
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a derivative and its asset is non-zero in equilibrium and depends on their relative margins and the 
leveraged investors’ shadow cost of capital. 
We use the framework of Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) to explain why the CIP 
deviations turned positive during the crisis.  In particular, the framework implies that a positive 
basis is an indicator that arbitrageurs would have liked to borrow dollars in the spot market but 
could not.  This is likely due to dollar hoarding by US institutions and a need by non-US 
institutions to fund their dollar denominated assets.
5
An alternative explanation (also discussed by Keynes (1923)) is that previously riskless 
cash flows became risky during the crisis.
  Next, we show that our proxy for margin 
conditions and the cost of capital are significant determinants of the basis, especially during the 
crisis period.  These results indicate that arbitrage transactions became difficult to implement in 
the international capital markets during the crisis due to funding constraints.   
6  Baba and Packer (2008) show that the basis 
increases in the difference in CDS prices of European and US firms indicating heightened 
counterparty risk in the FX swap markets.
7
                                                 
5 An example of reduced dollar supply is that U.S. money market funds abruptly stopped purchasing bank-issued 
commercial paper after they faced large redemptions following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Baba, 
McCauley, and Ramaswamy (2009)).  An example of dollar demand is that European institutions sought out the 
foreign exchange swap market to finance their special-purpose vehicles that had invested in U.S. mortgage-backed 
securities (Baba, Packer, and Nagano (2008)). 
  We find evidence that uncertainty about 
counterparty risk became a significant determinant of the basis, particularly after the failure of 
Lehman Brothers.  Taken together, our results therefore indicate a breakdown of arbitrage 
transactions partly due to lack of capital and partly due to heightened counterparty credit risk, 
with the relative importance of the two types of risks varying during different stages of the crisis. 
6 Holmes (1959) shows how CIP deviations tend to increase when sovereign risk and bank credit risk increases.  
Frenkel and Levich (1977) find that covered arbitrage profits increase during turbulent times.  Taylor (1989) shows 
that deviations from CIP tend to increase during periods of crisis (e.g. the inception of the European Monetary 
System in 1979) and they persist for some time.  Akram, Rime and Sarno (2008) find that CIP deviations increase 
with market volatility.   
7 International institutions obtain dollar funding in the FX swap markets, typically from US institutions that have a 
natural dollar deposit base.    
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To ease short-term dollar funding constraints, the Federal Reserve agreed to supply 
dollars to foreign central banks via reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with several 
developed and emerging market countries.  We find that announcements of the swap lines 
program were successful in bringing down the basis by an average of 5 basis points.  The actual 
auctions of dollars were also effective in bringing down the basis.  However, in the post-Lehman 
period, the swap lines programs did not have a significant effect on the basis possibly because 
they were not designed to bring down high levels of counterparty risk.
8
We conduct several robustness checks.  We repeat our regressions using changes in the 
basis (since the basis displays strong autocorrelation). We also repeat our analysis using high 
frequency (hourly) exchange rate data (this data is only available for part of our sample).  Our 
qualitative results remain the same in all cases. 
  These results further 
establish that funding constraint was a key driver of the basis in the early part of the crisis. 
Of related papers, Griffoli and Ranaldo (2009) also find that funding constraints explain 
the CIP deviations but, different from us, that counterparty risk does not.  The difference may 
arise because counterparty risk is likely to be less of a factor for the shorter maturity loans they 
examine (i.e. 1-week maturity compared to our 3-month maturity).  Further, Griffoli and Ranaldo 
(2009) assume that arbitrageurs are able to borrow at secured (i.e. OIS) rates whereas we use 
unsecured (i.e. LIBOR) funding rates when estimating CIP deviations.  Similar to our result, they 
find that central bank swap lines do not have an effect on the deviations after the Lehman failure.  
Baba and Packer (2008) find a decline in volatility of the basis but no change in its level due to 
                                                 
8 The swap lines might also reduce the basis via exchange rates, a mechanism we do not study.  Aizenmann and 
Pasricha (2009) find an affect of the swap lines on the exchange rates of emerging market countries.  
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the swap lines.  They focus on CDS prices as determinants of CIP deviations but do not consider 
arbitrageurs’ funding constraints as determinants of CIP deviations.
9
Our contribution, relative to these papers, lie in providing a unified framework (based on 
Garleanu and Pedersen (2009)) to (1) explain why the CIP deviations became positive and (2) 
derive empirical proxies for funding constraints.   Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) also document 
CIP deviations and comment on its correlation with the TED spread.  However, they do not 
conduct any formal econometric analysis.   
   
We extend this framework to develop an empirical measure of uncertainty about 
counterparty risk and show that CIP deviations are significantly related to this measure.
10
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section I, we describe our methodology and data.  
In Section II, we present estimates of the deviation from CIP.  In sections III and IV, we discuss 
the roles of credit risk and liquidity risk in explaining deviations from CIP and present results.  In 
Section V, we assess the impact of the Federal Reserve’s bilateral currency swap lines on the 
CIP deviations.  We conclude in Section VI.   
  The 
extended framework allows us to examine the evolution of credit risk and liquidity risk during 
the crisis and the interaction between them.  For example, Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue 
that small deviations from fundamentals may not be corrected when cash flows are risky.  Our 
results suggest that even large deviations may not be corrected if cash flows are risky and capital 
is limited.  Finally, we extend the prior evidence on the efficacy of public liquidity supply from 
the domestic context to the international markets. 
                                                 
9 Baba and Packer (2008) use the LIBOR-OIS spread as a proxy for liquidity risk but this proxy includes a 
substantial component of credit risk, as shown by Taylor and Williams (2008) and McAndrews et al (2008). Second, 
since they use LIBOR to estimate the basis, LIBOR is effectively on both sides of the regressions. 
10 Heider, Hoerlova and Holthausen (2009) show theoretically that such uncertainty is an important determinant of 
breakdowns in the interbank markets.  
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I.  Data and Measurement of Deviations from Covered Interest Parity 
The CIP relation is derived from the idea that exchange and international interest rates 
adjust to equalize the borrowing cost globally.   To make the idea concrete, consider the FX 
swap markets.  In an FX swap, two parties engage in a spot currency transaction while 
simultaneously agreeing to reverse the transaction at the current forward rate at a specified time 
in the future.  In essence, FX swaps allow counterparties to exchange funding at predetermined 
times in the future, in one currency for another currency, without FX risk.  However, Duffie and 
Huang (1996) show that there exists counterparty credit risk due to the cost of replacing the 
contract should counterparty default.      
A currency arbitrage involving FX swaps works as follows.  Let s be the spot rate, f the 
forward rate, i
D the domestic interest rate and i
F the foreign interest rate at time t.  Interest rates 
are in nominal units.  Exchange rates are in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign 
currency.  A domestic investor faces a choice between borrowing in the domestic 
uncollateralized cash market at an interest rate (1+i
D) or, alternatively, converting the domestic 
currency into foreign currency through an FX swap and borrowing in the foreign uncollateralized 
cash market at an interest rate (1+i
F).  The FX swap dealer quotes the forward differential (f/s).  
Therefore, if these two ways of borrowing are to be equally costly then the following condition 
must hold at each time t: 
( )
F
t
t
t D
t i
s
f
i + = + 1 1                                      (1) 
Equation (1) is the CIP relation.  Given data on the forward rate, the spot rate and the 
foreign interest rate i
F, the implied rate is the value of i
D that solves (1).  The USD basis (Basis
D) 
is the difference between the implied USD rate and a benchmark unsecured USD interest rate.  
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( ) ( ) rate interest    unsecured   1 1 USD i
s
f
Basis
F
t
t
t D
t + − + =                            (2) 
For most of our analysis, we use the euro-USD exchange rate, the euro LIBOR and USD 
LIBOR fixing rates to estimate the basis: 
( ) ) $ 1 ( 1
rate     $
rate     $
t t
t
t D
t LIBOR euroLIBOR
spot euro
forward euro
Basis + − + =                         (3) 
Arbitrage in international capital markets should ensure that the implied dollar rate is 
equal to the USD LIBOR rate, so that the basis is zero and CIP holds.  If, for example, the basis 
is positive (say, because LIBOR is lower than the implied rate), institutions should borrow at the 
LIBOR rate until the basis returns to zero.  Non-zero levels of the basis in normal times are 
likely due to temporary mispricings that are not arbitraged away (Akram et al (2008)). 
We obtain tradable quote data on spot and forward exchange rates from Tullet Pebron, a 
leading broker in FX markets.  Griffoli and Ranaldo (2009) use data from the same source. They 
discuss that the data is representative of the market in that all major participants are included.  
Further, they show that, although the prices are indicative, they are close to actual trading prices.  
The 3-month LIBOR rates are pulled from Reuters.   
Ideally, data for all legs of the arbitrage transaction should be synchronous.  For the early 
part of our sample, the exchange rate data are only available with close of business day values.  
Since LIBOR rates are announced at about 7am US Eastern Standard Time (EST), we calculate 
the day t implied rate by matching spot and forward exchange rate data for close of day t with 
LIBOR rates announced on day t+1 (where all times are US EST).  Starting from May 23 2008, 
we have available hourly data on the euro-USD exchange rate from Tullet Pebron which allows 
time-matching with LIBOR within the hour.  We present results for both sets of data; in general, 
our results are qualitatively similar whether using the daily and the hourly data.  
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II. Estimates of Deviations from Covered Interest Parity  
In this section we present estimates of deviations from CIP during the crisis period.  To 
show robustness of the estimates, we present several measures based on alternative dollar interest 
rates (USD LIBOR, NYFR and Treasury Bills) and alternative currency pairs (US dollar vis-à-
vis euro, British pound, Australian dollar, New Zealand dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc).  
In all cases, we estimate the USD basis for a 3-month term loan. The sample period spans 
January 2007 to March 2009 for a total of 564 daily observations. 
Section A shows estimates of the basis based on USD LIBOR, NYFR and Treasury bill 
rates for the daily and hourly euro-USD exchange rates.  Section B shows estimates of the basis 
based on different currency pairs.   
A.  Estimates of CIP deviation based on alternative dollar interest rates  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
  Figure 1 shows estimates of the USD basis using equation (3) for daily (dashed line) and 
hourly (solid line) euro-USD exchange rate data.  We observe that, prior to August 2007 (the 
start of the crisis), the basis hovered close to zero with deviations from zero likely due to 
temporary mispricings that were not arbitraged away.  However, since the crisis started, the euro-
USD basis has been consistently large and positive (implying a market-based dollar funding rate 
substantially higher than the USD LIBOR fixing rate).  The deviations have been particularly 
large since the Lehman bankruptcy of September 15 2008.  For the period where both hourly and 
daily exchange rate data is available, we observe that the two estimates track each other closely.   
Indeed, the correlation between the two basis measures is 0.94.  Therefore, our estimates of CIP 
deviations appear robust to the reporting frequency of the exchange rate data. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE  
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Panel A of Table 1 shows the mean and maximum values of the CIP deviations in basis 
points for different benchmark USD interest rates.  The first two rows of Panel A show estimates 
using the daily and hourly euro-USD exchange rates when USD LIBOR is the reference rate.  In 
the pre-crisis period, the mean and maximum deviations were less than 2 basis points in absolute 
value.  In the crisis period, two regimes may be observable.  Prior to September 2008, the basis 
was large relative to the pre-crisis period, rising to an average of 18 basis points for the daily 
data, with a maximum of 40 basis points.  After September 2008, the basis jumped to an average 
of 65 basis points using daily data and 70 basis points using hourly data.  The corresponding 
maxima were 233 and 246 basis points. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
  Figure 2 displays estimates of the basis when the USD LIBOR rate is replaced by the 
NYFR rate or the Treasury bill rate in equation (3).  As noted in the introduction, the NYFR is a 
purely domestic US rate unlike LIBOR, which has only 3 US banks among 16 LIBOR panel 
banks.  In addition, the NYFR was designed to minimize the incentives of banks to misreport 
their borrowing rates.  This NYFR data is available from May 30 2008.  Figure 2 shows that the 
behaviour of the NYFR basis is similar to that based on LIBOR: we observe a high and positive 
rate prior to September 2008 with a further sharp increase in September 2008.  Panel A of Table 
1 shows that the mean and maximum values of CIP deviations are similar whether based on 
LIBOR or NYFR.  The CIP deviations based on the Treasury bill rate display qualitatively 
similar dynamics as those based on LIBOR.  However, the bill basis is more than 3 times larger 
than that of the LIBOR basis (see Panel A of Table 1).  This is because the Treasury bill rate 
closely tracks the policy rate and the Federal Reserve has aggressively reduced the latter over the  
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crisis period.  In general, however, these results indicate the robustness of the evidence of CIP 
deviations with respect to alternative reference dollar interest rates. 
B.  Estimates of CIP deviation based on alternative currency pairs  
If increases in the USD basis rate are due to an excess demand for dollars globally from 
non-US institutions, we would expect to see a widening not just in the USD basis with respect to 
the euro, but also the USD basis with respect to other currencies.   Accordingly, we estimate the 
basis for the US dollar vis-à-vis Australian dollar, the Swiss franc, the British pound, the 
Japanese yen and the New Zealand dollar.  To calculate the USD basis with respect to a currency 
different from euro, we use equation (2) along with the interest and exchange rates denominated 
in the relevant currency.  For example, for the USD-GBP currency pair, we back out an implied 
dollar rate using the GBP LIBOR rate, and the spot and forward USD-GBP exchange rates. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
From Figure 3, we observe that for five other currency pairs (USD-AUD, USD-CHF, 
USD-GBP, USD-JPY, and USD-NZD), the basis has also widened dramatically since September 
15, 2008 and generally followed a path similar to that of the euro-USD basis.  Panel B of Table 1 
shows the mean and maximum values of the basis estimates for the different currency pairs.  We 
observe that the mean and maximum values are similar for different currency pairs, and 
moreover they are comparable to those for the USD-euro pair in Panel A of Table 1.  One 
exception is the USD-AUD pair in the period since September 16 2008 when its basis value 
appears to be high compared to the other currency pairs.  Overall, the evidence supports the 
hypothesis of a structural increase in the demand for dollars worldwide, possibly increasing the 
implied dollar rate and widening the basis.  
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In this section we find robust evidence that deviations from CIP have been large and 
persistent since August 2007.  Estimates of the CIP deviation based on a variety of dollar interest 
rates and a variety of currency pairs all depict similar patterns: large and positive deviations in 
CIP after August 2007 followed by an even sharper increase following the Lehman bankruptcy 
in September 2008.  In the remainder of the paper, we explain why the arbitrage condition 
implicit in the CIP relation breaks down during the crisis and we assess the Federal Reserve’s 
success in reducing CIP deviations through the supply of US dollars.  
III. Determinants of CIP Deviations: Discussion and Empirical Methodology 
In this section, we discuss a theoretical framework for understanding CIP deviations. We 
then use the framework to understand why the deviations were positive (section A) and to 
propose empirical proxies for funding constraints (section B) and credit risk (section C). 
Suppose the USD LIBOR is lower than the rate implied by CIP.  In theory, arbitrageurs 
can earn riskless profits by borrowing USD for 3 months at the LIBOR rate, swapping into euros, 
investing at the euro LIBOR rate, and finally closing the swap in 3 months by converting back 
into dollars at the forward rate prevailing at the time of the swap.  However, if funding is not 
available to arbitrageurs, then the trade does not occur and the CIP deviation persists.  Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) show how negative shocks are amplified if investors withdraw money from 
funds.  Gromb and Vayanos (2002) show that when margin-constrained arbitrageurs face capital 
scarcity, a negative shock induces them to liquidate their own positions and widens price 
discrepancy.
11
                                                 
11 Geanakoplos (2003) derive margin constraints endogenously and shows the optimality of margin debt contracts.  
  Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) study the feedback effects between margins 
and market conditions.  
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Basak and Croitoru (2006) and Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) show that, in equilibrium, 
the basis between an asset S and a derivative D (i.e. the expected return on S minus the expected 
return on D) is not zero if there are leverage constraints on S and position limits on D.  The basis 
represents differences in risk premia required by heterogeneous groups of investors.  For 
example, Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) show that if risk-averse investors can short only a 
limited amount of D, then in equilibrium the risk tolerant investor is long S and also long D, and 
the basis is: 
( )
D
t
S
t t
D S
t m m Basis − ≈
− ψ                                     (5) 
where ψ is the margin constrained investor’s shadow cost of capital and m
i is the margin on 
security i.  A positive basis arises if the margin on D is lower than that on S, which induces the 
risk tolerant investor to accept a lower risk premium on D. 
Alternatively, if the risk-averse investor holds a long position in D then, in equilibrium, 
the risk-tolerant investor goes long in S and short in D.  Since the latter has to pay margins on 
both legs of the basis trade, the basis is a function of the sum of the two margins: 
( )
D
t
S
t t
D S
t m m Basis + ≈
− ψ                                     (6) 
A.  Why were Deviations from Covered Interest Parity Positive? 
In theory, deviations from CIP could be positive or negative.  But, as we have seen, they 
were consistently positive.  We use the framework of Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) to 
understand the sign of the basis after the crisis. In the context of CIP deviations, the implied rate 
may be viewed as the return from the FX swap position D while the LIBOR rate is the return on 
the spot dollar position S.  The positive basis means that the situation described by (6) applies 
and arbitrageurs are long S and short D.  Why are arbitrageurs long dollars?  They prefer to 
borrow dollars at the cheaper dollar rates and lend out at the foreign interest rates.  However, as  
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discussed in Coffey et al (2009), they are unable to do so because of an acute shortage of US 
dollars (as discussed further in footnote 5). 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
We now discuss the empirical proxies for margin constraints and the shadow cost of 
capital.  Since arbitrage transactions are not riskless in reality, we also discuss a number of risk 
measures that we propose as determinants of the basis.  A summary of all variable definitions is 
in Table 2. 
B.  Empirical proxy for margin constraint and shadow cost of capital 
Our empirical proxy for the tightness of margin conditions is the 3-month agency MBS-GC 
repo spread which is the repo rate using agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) as collateral 
minus the General Collateral (GC) repo rate using Treasury securities as collateral.
12  Banks rely 
on the repo market for short term collaterized financing, and so the repo rates should reflect 
financing stress during the crisis.
13   Since both MBS and GC repo loans are collaterized, the 
spread between them mainly reflects the liquidity difference between the two assets.  In 
particular, agency MBS securities became highly illiquid during the crisis, leading to an increase 
in the agency MBS-GC repo spread.  Since margins are expected to increase with illiquidity, 
increases in the MBS-GC repo spread is as a proxy for increasingly tight margin conditions.
14
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
  
The data is from Bloomberg.   
                                                 
12 General collateral includes: general Treasury collateral; general Federal Agency and GSE collateral; and general 
MBS collateral. It excludes reverse repurchase agreement activity non-general collateral repurchase agreement 
activity.  
13 Brunnermeier (2008) uses this spread to illustrate liquidity risk during the crisis. 
14 Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) use the tightness of credit condition variable in the senior officer bank loan survey 
as a proxy for increasing tightness.  This data, however, is only available at the quarterly frequency.  
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Figure 4 plots the agency-MBS repo spread and the basis based on the euro-dollar FX rate 
and the USD LIBOR rate.  Except for brief periods after the Lehman bankruptcy, the repo spread 
is positive, consistent with the greater illiquidity of MBS relative to Treasuries.  The expected 
association between the CIP deviation and the repo spread is positive.  While this is true for 
some periods during the crisis, for other periods (especially in 2008), the repo spread and the 
basis appears to diverge.  We will examine the co-movement and the basis in greater detail in the 
next section. 
Garleanu and Pedersen (2009) show that the arbitrageur’s shadow cost of capital is the 
interest rate spread between an uncollaterized and collaterized loan.   We use the 3-month TED 
spread (i.e. the LIBOR minus the Treasury bill rate) and the 3-month LIBOR-GC repo spread as 
proxies for the shadow cost of capital.  Figure 5, which plots the TED spread over the sample 
period, shows that the basis and the TED spread move together, as also shown by Garleanu and 
Pedersen (2009).  The expected association between the CIP deviation and the TED or the 
LIBOR-GC repo spread is positive and Figure 5 shows that the basis and the TED spread 
generally co-move together.   
C.  Empirical proxy for credit risk 
If arbitrage was not riskless during the crisis, then CIP deviations need not constitute 
violations of the Law of One Price.  As our discussion of the repo spread indicated, there was 
market liquidity risk as the MBS market became illiquid before the Fed’s TSLF program 
improved liquidity in the market.  In addition, counterparty risk increased substantially during 
the crisis, which increased the likelihood that the FX swap contract would have to be replaced on 
unfavorable terms.  
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The market liquidity risk measure is the yield of a hypothetical 10-year off-the-run par 
bond minus the on-the-run 10-year Treasury yield, called the par-OTR spread.  The data for the 
on-the-run 10-year Treasury yield is from Haver while the par bond yields are from the public 
website of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.  The hypothetical 10-year Treasury trading at 
par is derived from a Nelson-Siegel-Svensson zero-coupon curve estimated from off-the-run 
Treasury coupon securities.  The par-OTR spread is a measure of the market liquidity premium 
of the on-the-run 10-year Treasury, and is likely related to liquidity premia in the Treasury 
market in general. Since Treasury securities are the most liquid U.S. securities and usually richen 
when demand for liquid and safe securities rises, the par-OTR spread is taken to be a proxy of 
systematic market liquidity risk in the economy.
15
The expected sign of the correlation between illiquidity measures and the basis is 
ambiguous.  Increases in the par-OTR spread have two effects.  Increased illiquidity in the US 
markets makes it less likely that US institutions would be willing to supply dollars in the FX 
swap market which should increase the basis.  However, increased illiquidity also reduces 
funding in the US market and thereby increases the LIBOR rate, which tends to decrease the 
basis.  
  
The credit risk measures are:  
•  CDX: The CDX IG index of CDS prices  
•  Dispersion: The quote dispersion of LIBOR panel banks  
CDX represents the average default risk in the economy.  Data on the 5-year CDX 
investment grade (IG) index is from Markit.  The index covers 125 names in North America and 
                                                 
15 Although it represents a liquidity premium, the PAR-OTR spread cannot be taken to represent margin constraints, 
unlike the MBS-GC spread.  First, the PAR-OTR is a spread between yields and not repo rates. Indeed, repo rates 
for on-the-run Treasuries diverge from GC repo rates (Keane (1995)).  Second, changes in the PAR-OTR spread 
also depend on the specialness of Treasury securities (Duffie (1996)).  
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represents the average credit risk of major global firms. Counterparty risk is represented by the 
quote dispersion among LIBOR panel banks.  To measure quote dispersion, we obtain from 
Bloomberg the daily 3-month USD LIBOR quotes of the 16 banks in the LIBOR panel of the 
British Bankers’ Association and then calculate the maximum minus the minimum of the quotes 
each day.  The quote dispersion shows the extent to which some LIBOR panel banks report 
greater borrowing costs, and therefore more default risk, compared to the typical LIBOR panel 
bank.  In turn, increased quote dispersion of LIBOR banks may reflect a situation where banks in 
general charge higher interest rates to higher risk counterparties.  The expected sign of the 
correlation of credit risk with the basis depends on whether the credit risk is greater for US or for 
non-US institutions.  If the credit risk increases more for non-US firms then i
F increases more 
than USD LIBOR and so the basis increases; in the reverse case, the basis decreases. 
Finally, we control for foreign exchange risk and general market risk using: 
•  EVOL: Options-implied volatility in the euro-USD foreign exchange market. 
•  VIX: Options-implied volatility in the equity market   
The implied volatility for the euro-USD exchange rate is calculated by JP Morgan, and this data 
is obtained from Bloomberg.  Investors are affected by FX volatility if they need to replace the 
FX swaps contract due to the failure of their counterparty.  The equity implied volatility is given 
by the VIX measure, data for which is pulled from Bloomberg.  We use the VIX to measure the 
risk aversion of investors in the broad financial markets.  To the extent that equity investors 
respond to the same set of risk factors as investors in the money markets, movements in VIX 
may be informative of variations in funding costs.    
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IV. Explaining CIP Deviations: Results 
In this section, we explain deviations in CIP as a breakdown in the Law of One Price due 
to capital constraints of arbitrageurs in the international money and FX markets (section A).  
Specifically, changes in margin constraints and arbitrageurs’ cost of capital are expected to 
determine CIP deviations.  In section B, we also explore the hypothesis that CIP deviations 
reflected the increased risk of arbitrage transactions and therefore did not necessarily constitute a 
breakdown in the Law of One Price.  In section C, we examine whether ddeviations from CIP 
may be expected to increase in the credit risk of non-US institutions relative to US firms. 
A.  CIP deviations, margin constraint and shadow cost of capital 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Table 3 shows the correlation of the basis with the MBS-GC repo spread.  Prior to the 
crisis, the basis and the repo spread moved together, with a correlation of 0.15, consistent with 
theory.  From August 2007 till September 15 2008, the basis and the repo spread tend to diverge, 
and the correlation becomes negative (-0.40).  The negative co-movement generally occurs in 
2008 when the Federal Reserve intervened to exchange illiquid MBS collateral for liquid 
Treasury collateral via the TSLF program (Fleming, Hrung and Keane, 2009).  This had the 
effect of bringing down the illiquidity premium in the repo spread at a time when the basis was 
still increasing.  After September 15 2008, the correlation becomes positive again (0.38).  In 
contrast to the repo spread, the correlation of the basis, TED and the LIBOR-GC spread are 
positive for all sample periods, as expected. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Table 4 shows results from a regression of the USD basis on its own lag, the repo spread 
and the shadow cost of capital for the pre-crisis period, the pre-Lehman and post-Lehman crisis  
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periods.  Panel A shows results when the shadow cost of capital is represented by the TED 
spread.  For the pre-crisis period, the margin constraint and the TED spread are both estimated 
positively, but only the TED spread coefficient is significant.  The intercept is negative and 
significant, implying a higher margin on the uncollaterized LIBOR position, as expected.  The 
adjusted R-squared is only about 6%, indicating that, in the pre-crisis period, changes in the basis 
are mostly random.  For the period August 2007 to September 15 2008, the basis becomes highly 
autocorrelated and the intercept is no longer significant.  Both the repo spread and the TED 
spread are significant determinants of the basis, with a negative and positive sign, respectively.  
In the final crisis period, the repo spread and the TED spread are positively associated with the 
basis, but only the former result is significant.  Panel B of Table 4 repeats the regressions using 
the LIBOR-GC repo spread as the interest rate spread.  The results are qualitatively similar to 
those using the TED spread.  Overall, the signs of the coefficients are consistent with the 
unconditional correlations.  The results indicate that the cost of capital is a positive, and 
generally significant, determinant of the basis, consistent with Garleanu and Pedersen (2009).  In 
addition, the margin constraint is binding during the crisis period, with tighter margins increasing 
the basis except for the early period of the crisis when the Fed intervened to relax collateral 
constraints, as discussed earlier. 
B.  CIP deviations, credit risk and liquidity risk 
Table 3 shows that the correlation between the basis and the par-OTR spread has changed 
over the course of the crisis.  It is positive prior to the crisis, negative in the pre-Lehman period 
and positive again after the Lehman bankruptcy.  The correlation of the basis with the CDX 
index is positive before the Lehman bankruptcy and negative afterwards.  The changing signs of 
the correlations suggest that the relative credit and liquidity risk of US institutions vis-à-vis non- 
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US firms were changing over the course of the crisis.  The correlation of the basis with 
dispersion is always positive in the crisis period and is more than 60% after the Lehman 
bankruptcy.  Dispersion has relatively low correlation with CDS prices, indicating that they measure 
different dimensions of credit risk.  EVOL and VIX have a correlation of close to 50% with the 
basis in the pre-Lehman period and more moderate correlation afterwards. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
Table 5 shows results from a regression of the USD basis on its own lag, the repo spread, 
the interest rate spread and the various risk measures.  Panel A shows results when we use the 
TED spread.  The sign and significance of the repo spread and the TED spread are the same as 
when we did not include the risk measures, with one exception.  In the post-Lehman period, the 
TED spread has a negative and significant association with the basis, in contrast with a positive 
sign earlier.  During this period, the correlation between the TED spread and Dispersion is 0.90 
from Table 3, indicating that the TED spread is mainly driven by counterparty risk.  Dispersion 
is positively and significantly with the basis at this time, and it is probably difficult to estimate 
the separately the effects of the TED spread and counterparty risk.  Of the remaining risk 
measures, PAR-OTR is a significant determinant of the basis during the crisis period.  It has a 
negative association with the basis in the pre-Lehman period and a positive association 
afterwards.  This suggests that US banks may have been hoarding liquidity in the pre-Lehman 
phase of the crisis, reducing the supply of dollars to the FX swap market, and thereby increasing 
the basis.  The CDX index and EVOL are not significant determinants of the basis, while the 
VIX is only significant in the pre-Lehman crisis period.  Panel B reports results when the 
LIBOR-GC repo spread is used; the results are similar to those in Panel A.   
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To what extent are the CIP deviations driven by increases in risk measures during the 
crisis? Comparing Tables 4 and 5, addition of the risk measures doubles the adjusted R-squared 
during the pre-crisis period.  In the pre-Lehman crisis period, there is no change in the adjusted 
R-squared; in the post-Lehman period, it increases from about 0.78 to about 0.82.  Of the risk 
measures, the PAR-OTR measure is a significant determinant of the basis during the crisis period 
but it is not significant during the pre-crisis period.  Dispersion is a significant determinant of the 
basis during the pre-crisis period and the post-Lehman period.  This evidence points to a 
moderate effect of the risk measures during the post-Lehman phase of the crisis. 
C.  Relative credit risk of US versus non-US firms 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
The expected sign of the correlation of credit risk with the basis depends on whether the 
credit risk increases more for US firms (which increases USD LIBOR) or more for non-US 
institutions (which increases the foreign interest rate i
F).  Figure 5 shows quotes submitted by 
firms to the LIBOR panel indicate the dollar funding costs of US and non-US institutions.  
Throughout the crisis, the average quote submitted by a non-US bank on the USD LIBOR panel 
has tracked slightly higher than the average quote submitted by a US bank and this difference has 
become more pronounced since September 2008.  This suggests meaningful differences in dollar 
funding costs between US and non-US institutions over this period. 
Given the ambiguity of the effects of the aggregate default risk measure, we also define a 
measure of relative default risk:  
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•  Relative default risk: The average CDS prices of 13 non-US banks in the LIBOR panel 
minus the average CDS prices of 10 systematically important US banks.
16
We expect the relative credit risk measure to be positively correlated with the basis. 
  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Table 6 shows results from a regression with the CDX index replaced by the relative 
credit risk of non-US versus US banks.  For brevity, we do not show results for the other risk 
measures.  The results in Panel A, using the TED spread, shows that the relative credit risk 
measure is significant in all periods.  The results in Panel B, using the LIBOR-GC repo spread, 
shows that it is significant in every period except the pre-Lehman crisis period.  Replacing the 
CDX index with the relative credit risk measure increases the adjusted R-squared in the pre-crisis 
period and the post-Lehman period.  The relative credit risk is another measure of the dispersion 
in credit risk (between US and non-US firms).  The results therefore provide strong evidence of 
the significance of this measure, especially after the Lehman failure. 
In this section, we have provided evidence that changes in margin constraints and the cost 
of capital were significant determinants of CIP deviations during the crisis period, consistent 
with the hypothesis that the CIP deviations represent violations of the Law of One Price as 
arbitrageurs became capital constrained.   Market liquidity risk and the dispersion in credit risk 
are also significant determinants of CIP deviations, especially after the Lehman bankruptcy.  
Indeed, the Federal Reserve provided unlimited amounts of dollars to foreign Central Banks after 
September 20008.  In the next section, we examine whether the Fed’s dollar liquidity supply 
eased funding constraints and reduced the basis. 
                                                 
16 The 10 systematically important US banks are those defined by the Treasury in its TARP plan. : Bank of America, 
Bank of NY Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, State Street 
Corp, Wachovia, Wells Fargo.  Bank of America agreed to buy Merrill Lynch on September 15 2008 but the 
acquisition did not officially close till January 2009.  Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia on October 4 2008.  
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V. Central Bank Currency Swaps and CIP Deviations 
In this section, we investigate the effect of the Central Bank swap lines on deviations of 
CIP.  To the extent that the deviations are due to arbitrageur’s capital constraints in the 
international money markets, the supply of dollars by the Federal Reserve may be expected to 
alleviate the problem. The Fed supplies dollars to international Central Banks through bilateral 
currency arrangements whereby it supplies dollars in exchange for foreign currency for a 
specified period. The foreign Central Bank then supplies dollars to banks in its jurisdictions via 
auctions. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
Table 7 shows significant announcement dates for the program.  The program was 
initiated on December 12 2007 as the Fed arranged swap lines with the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB).  As the dollar shortage in the international money 
markets became more acute, the program was expanded in size and scope.  After the Lehman 
bankruptcy in September 2008, the size of the swap lines was greatly expanded and ultimately 
the cap on the amount distributed was removed altogether. 
To determine the effect of the program on the basis, we define a dummy variable that 
equals 1 on days with swap announcements.  The only exception is February 1 2008 when the 
dummy has value -1 because the ECB withdrew from the auctions in February, which effectively 
constituted a negative supply of dollars.  We also have a dummy variable for days when the Fed 
conducted TAF auctions where US branches of foreign banks participated and obtained dollars. 
We do not include dummy variables for auction dates of the ECB since these dates coincided 
with TAF auction days leading to a collinearity problem in the regressions.  While we expect the 
market impact of the program to be manifested mainly on announcement days, the initial  
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auctions may be expected to have additional impacts as market participants learnt about the 
program. As the program progressed, and participants became familiar, the auctions (which fall 
on specific dates of the month), are expected to have less effect on the basis. 
In estimating the effects of the swap lines, we control for credit risk but not for liquidity 
risk.  This is because the swap lines are expected to reduce liquidity risk.  In addition, we control 
for term risk since the loans are for term maturities (mostly for 28 and 84 day maturities) rather 
than for overnight maturities.  We use the difference between the 10-year Treasury note and the 
3-month bill (both constant maturity) to capture changes in the slope of the yield curve.  Finally, 
we switch from using the level of the basis to using changes in the basis.  This is because the 
swap dummy is a binary variable.  If the effect of the swap lines is persistent, then it is necessary 
to use the change in the basis to capture this effect, as explained by McAndrews et al (2008) in 
the context of the Fed’s Term Auction Facilities (TAF). 
The regression is of the following form: 
t t t t CONTROLS Auctions SwapAnn Intercept Basis ε α α + ∆ + + + = ∆ $ 2 1                        (7) 
where SwapAnn is a dummy variable for announcement days of the swap line program, 
$Auctions is a dummy variable for TAF auction days, CONTROL are the variables to control for 
credit risk and market risk and Δ indicates that the variable is in changes.  The control factors are 
the CDX index, Dispersion, VIX, EVOL and the term spread.  
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
The results of the regression are in Table 8.  The sample period is August 1 2007 till 
March 30 2009.  Since announcement effects may be short-lived, higher data frequency is likely 
to improved results.  Consequently, we initially report results in Panel A for the basis using the 
hourly euro-dollar FX data which is available from May 23 2008.  To check for robustness, we  
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then repeat the regression using the daily euro-dollar FX data.  The results in Panel A indicate 
that, in the period from May 23 2008 to September 15 2008, the swap line announcements 
reduced the basis by an average of more than 5 basis points.  In addition, the dollar auctions 
reduced the basis by an additional 1.3 basis point per auction, although this result is only 
significant at the 10% level.  In contrast, for the period after Lehman, there is no statistically 
significant effect of the swap lines on the basis.  This result is intuitive since, from our prior 
results, counterparty risk was a significant determinant of the basis in the post-Lehman period 
and the Fed’s program was not designed to reduce counterparty risk. 
The results in Panel B, using daily data, are qualitatively similar to those in Panel A when 
considering the same sample period.  Thus for the period from May 23 2008 to September 15 
2008, the swap announcements reduce the basis by an average of 3 basis points but there is no 
statistically significant effect in the post-Lehman period.  Considering the period from August 
2007 to September 15 2008, we find that the swap announcements were not significant but the 
auctions reduced the basis by almost 1.5 basis points per auction.  For the period from December 
2007 till May 2008, the swap line announcements had no significant effect on the basis while the 
auctions reduced the basis by about 2 basis points per auction (although this effect is significant 
only at the 10% level).   
In summary, the Fed’s swap lines program appears to have been successful in reducing 
the basis during periods when capital constraints were binding and less so during periods when 
counterparty risk was a significant determinant of the basis.  In the above analysis, we only 
looked at the effect of swap lines on the interest rate basis. Aizenman and Pasricha (2009) find 
that the swap lines significantly impact exchange rates of emerging market countries.  Thus, it is  
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possible that the swap lines affect CIP deviations through exchange rate changes in addition to 
the interest rate differentials.  
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we document a substantial and significant breakdown in CIP following the 
onset of the current crisis.  Specifically, we measure the deviation from CIP by the dollar 
“basis”, defined as the difference between the dollar rate implied by the CIP relation (henceforth, 
the “implied rate”) and a benchmark dollar interest rate.  We show that, while in normal periods, 
the basis is miniscule it has been consistently large and positive since the start of the crisis and 
increased dramatically in mid-September 2008 following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.  
This result is robust to the use of alternative benchmark dollar interest rates (such as USD 
LIBOR, NYFR and Treasury Bill rates) and the use of different currency pairs (such as the USD-
euro, USD-Japanese Yen, USD - British pound, USD - Swiss franc, and USD - New Zealand 
dollar) in deriving the basis.   
Our results show that capital constraints of arbitrageurs appear to be a key driver of CIP 
deviations.  Our proxy for margin conditions and the cost of capital are significant determinants 
of the basis, especially during the crisis period.  These results are consistent with a deviation of 
the Law of One Price during the crisis as arbitrage transactions became difficult in the 
international money markets due to funding constraints.  In addition, we find evidence that 
uncertainty about counterparty risk became an issue following the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, so that previously riskless cash flows became risky.  These results indicate a 
breakdown of arbitrage transactions in the international capital markets partly due to lack of 
capital and partly due to heightened counterparty credit risk.  
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To ease short-term dollar funding constraints in the international money markets, the 
Federal Reserve agreed to supply dollars to foreign central banks via reciprocal currency 
arrangements (swap lines) with several developed and a few emerging market countries.  We 
find that announcements of the swap lines program were successful in bringing down the basis 
by an average of 5 basis points.  The actual auctions of dollars were also effective in bringing 
down the basis.  However, in the post-Lehman period, the swap lines programs did not have a 
significant effect on the basis possibly because they were not designed to bring down high levels 
of counterparty risk.  In addition, the swap might affect exchange rates as shown by Aizenman 
and Pasricha (2009) who find an affect of the swap lines on emerging market countries 
(however, they did not examine exchange rates of developed countries). This is an area for 
further research. 
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Table 1: Measures of CIP Deviation  
 
Panel A: Estimates based on euro-dollar exchange rate and alternative dollar interest rates 
 
    1/1/2007-7/31/2007  8/01/2007 - 9/15/2008  9/15/2008 - 3/31/2009 
Interest 
rate 
FX data 
frequency 
Mean  Max  Mean  Max  Mean  Max 
LIBOR  Daily  -1.322   1.740   18.046   39.674   65.353   233.022  
Obs.  144     279     135    
LIBOR  Hourly   ---  ---  27.073   40.772   70.024   246.314  
Obs.  ---    79     134    
NYFR  Daily  ---  ---  25.090   38.869   55.915   195.022  
Obs.  ---    75     133    
T. Bill  Daily  35.782   79.226   141.555   242.260   247.003   572.891  
Obs.  145     281     135    
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Estimates based on dollar LIBOR rate and alternative currencies vis-à-vis dollar 
  8/01/2007 - 9/15/2008  9/15/2008 - 3/31/2009 
Currency   Mean  Max  Mean  Max 
AUS  10.790   40.218   122.483   509.532  
Obs  275     73  
CHF  20.576   43.328   41.301   191.037  
Obs  275     134  
GBP  24.342   51.676   90.038   235.752  
Obs  275     133  
JPY  11.950   31.471   32.257   219.336  
Obs  275     134  
NZD  4.847   37.193   49.983   140.820  
Obs  275     73  
         
The table shows the mean and maximum values of deviations from Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP) in 
basis points for the pre-crisis period (January 1, 2007 – July 31 2007), the pre-Lehman period (August 1 
2007 – September 15, 2008) and the post-Lehman period (September 16 2008 – March 30 2009).  The 
deviations are equal to the US dollar (USD) interest rate implied by the CIP relation (“the implied rate”) 
minus the USD interest rate.  In Panel A of the table, the implied rate is estimated using the euro-dollar 
exchange rate and the euro LIBOR rate.  The USD interest rates are USD LIBOR, NYFR or Treasury bill 
rates.  The euro-dollar data frequency is either daily or hourly.  The hourly dollar-euro data is available 
from May 23 2008 only.  In Panel B of the table, the USD interest rate is USD LIBOR.  The implied rate 
is based on the following exchange rates: USD-Australian dollar (AUS), USD-Swiss franc (CHF), USD -
British pound (GBP), USD -Japanese Yen (JPY) and USD -New Zealand dollar (NZD).  The USD-AUS 
and USD-NZD exchange rate data are only available through December 31 2008.32 
 
Table 2:  Variable Definitions  
 
Basis  USD interest rate implied by the CIP relation (“the implied rate”) minus the USD 
LIBOR rate.  The implied rate is estimated using the euro-dollar spot and 
forward exchange rates and the euro LIBOR rate.   
MBS_GC  3-month agency MBS repo rate minus General Collateral (GC) repo spread 
LIB_GC  3-month LIBOR-GC repo spread: LIBOR rate minus GC repo rate 
TED   3-month LIBOR rate minus 3-month Treasury bill rate 
Par-OTR  Yield on hypothetical off-the-run 10-year Treasury trading at par minus yield the 
on-the-run 10-year Treasury 
CDX  CDX IG index 
NUS-US CDS  Average of CDS prices of 13 non-US banks in LIBOR panel minus average of 
CDS prices of 10 systemically important US banks 
Disp.  Maximum minus minimum quote of banks in USD LIBOR panel 
VIX  Equity implied volatility Index 
EVOL  Euro-US dollar exchange rate implied volatility 
Swap ann.  Dummy variable equal to 1 on days with announcements of the Fed’s currency 
swap lines program (dates in Table 7) 
$ auctions  Dates of days when the Fed auctioned dollars to banks 
 
The table describes the variables used in the regressions.   
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Table 3: Correlation of Basis and Its Determinants 
 
Panel A: January 1, 2007 –July 31, 2007 
  Basis  MBS_
GC 
TED  LIB_ 
GC 
Par_ 
OTR 
Disp.  CDX  VIX  EVOL   
Basis  1.000                   
MBS_GC  0.218  1.000                 
TED  0.244  0.392  1.000               
LIB_GC  0.282  0.855  0.507  1.000             
Par_OTR  -0.138  0.143  0.056  0.049  1.000           
Disp.  -0.183  -0.431  -0.117  -0.368  -0.267  1.000         
CDX  0.006  0.628  0.249  0.658  0.505  -0.327  1.000       
VIX  0.010  0.482  0.349  0.453  0.521  -0.286  0.800  1.000     
EVOL  -0.198  -0.230  -0.401  -0.322  0.101  0.061  -0.055  -0.129  1.000   
 
Panel B: August 1, 2007 –September 15, 2008 
  Basis  MBS_
GC 
TED  LIB_ 
GC 
Par_ 
OTR 
Disp.  CDX  VIX  EVOL   
Basis  1.000                   
MBS_GC  -0.400  1.000                 
TED  -0.054  0.535  1.000               
LIB_GC  0.114  0.685  0.732  1.000             
Par_OTR  0.472  0.109  -0.118  0.258  1.000           
Disp.  0.069  0.213  0.530  0.369  -0.296  1.000         
CDX  0.196  0.071  -0.238  0.034  0.720  -0.514  1.000       
VIX  -0.455  0.383  0.152  0.014  0.155  -0.205  0.331  1.000     
EVOL  0.498  -0.018  -0.053  0.211  0.732  -0.214  0.679  0.101  1.000   
 
Panel C: September 15, 2008 –March 30, 2009 
  Basis  MBS_
GC 
TED  LIB_ 
GC 
Par_ 
OTR 
Disp.  CDX  VIX  EVOL   
Basis  1.000                   
MBS_GC  0.383  1.000                 
TED  0.605  0.442  1.000               
LIB_GC  0.492  0.483  0.967  1.000             
Par_OTR  -0.380  0.315  -0.357  -0.251  1.000           
Disp.  0.611  0.329  0.898  0.843  -0.469  1.000         
CDX  -0.112  0.112  -0.284  -0.256  0.380  -0.405  1.000       
VIX  0.350  0.652  0.450  0.504  0.296  0.308  0.355  1.000     
EVOL  -0.124  0.330  -0.277  -0.215  0.651  -0.301  0.339  0.324  1.000   
 
The table shows the correlations between the basis and its determinants for the pre-crisis period (January 
1, 2007 – July 31 2007; Panel A), the pre-Lehman period (August 1 2007 – September 15, 2008; Panel B) 
and the post-Lehman period (September 16 2008 – March 30 2009; Panel C). Variable definitions are in 
Table 2. 34 
 
Table 4: CIP Deviations, Margin Constraints and Interest Rate Spreads 
 
Panel A: Interest rate spread = TED spread 
  1/1/2007-7/31/2007  8/01/2007 - 9/15/2008  9/15/2008 - 3/31/2009 
Explanatory 
variable 
Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats 
Intercept  -2.138**  -4.419  0.670  0.921  5.601  1.585 
Lag Basis  0.038  0.365  0.922**  43.210  0.796**  9.600 
MBS-GC  0.045  1.289  -0.024*  -1.917  0.100*  1.809 
TED  0.012*  2.540  0.015*  2.031  0.017  0.358 
Adj. R
2  0.058    0.890    0.783   
OBS
  137    235    132   
 
Panel B: Interest rate spread = LIBOR-GC repo spread 
  1/1/2007-7/31/2007  8/01/2007 - 9/15/2008  9/15/2008 - 3/31/2009 
Explanatory 
variable 
Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats 
Intercept  -3.429**  -3.283  0.405  0.498  6.796*  1.833 
Lag Basis  0.034  0.296  0.896**  37.315  0.817**  11.870 
MBS-GC  -0.025  -0.670  -0.044**  -2.800  0.109*  2.009 
LIB-GC  0.118*  2.239  0.037**  2.619  0.001  0.024 
Adj. R
2  0.062    0.893    0.782   
OBS
  137    272    131   
 
** denotes 1% significance and * denotes 5% significance 
 
The table shows results from regressions of the 3-month basis on a lag of the basis, the MBS-GC repo 
spread and the TED spread (Panel A) or the LIBOR-GC repo spread (Panel B).  Variable definitions are 
in Table 2.  The regression is estimated separately for the pre-crisis period (January 1, 2007 – July 31 
2007), the pre-Lehman period (August 1 2007 – September 15, 2008) and the post-Lehman period 
(September 16 2008 – March 30 2009).  The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation using the Newey-West procedure with the number of lags truncated at 5. 35 
 
Table 5: CIP Deviations, Credit Risk and Liquidity Risk 
 
Panel A: Interest rate spread = TED spread 
  1/1/2007-7/31/2007  8/01/2007 - 9/15/2008  9/15/2008 - 3/31/2009 
Explanatory 
variable 
Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats 
Intercept  0.730  0.821  0.463  0.186  34.354  1.383 
Lag Basis  -0.029  -0.294  0.812**  19.674  0.716**  9.572 
MBS-GC  0.051  1.575  -0.055**  -2.628  0.195*  2.366 
TED  0.012*  2.116  0.025**  2.592  -0.121*  -2.207 
Liquidity Risk           
PAR-OTR  -0.137  -1.431  0.330**  3.342  -0.736*  -2.106 
Credit Risk           
CDX  -0.013  -0.828  0.008  0.648  0.068  0.713 
Disp.  -0.541**  -2.607  0.113  1.142  0.370**  3.102 
Market Risk           
VIX  -0.011  -0.237  -0.205*  -2.183  0.184  0.444 
EVOL  -0.085  -1.125  -0.103  -0.460  -0.228  -0.304 
Adj. R
2  0.109    0.894    0.820   
OBS
  135    265    129   
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Interest rate spread = LIBOR-GC repo spread 
  1/1/2007-7/31/2007  8/01/2007 - 9/15/2008  9/15/2008 - 3/31/2009 
Explanatory 
variable 
Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats 
Intercept  -1.719  -1.350  1.083  0.437  34.124  1.385 
Lag Basis  -0.060  -0.635  0.828**  20.977  0.679**  9.335 
MBS-GC  -0.017  -0.425  -0.056**  -2.970  0.196*  2.394 
LIB-GC  0.160**  3.257  0.033*  1.909  -0.133*  -2.421 
Liquidity Risk           
PAR-OTR  -0.066  -0.666  0.275**  3.092  -0.701*  -1.923 
Credit Risk           
CDX  -0.044**  -2.637  0.002  0.131  0.052  0.516 
Disp.  -0.469*  -2.156  0.092  1.015  0.337**  3.379 
Market Risk           
VIX  0.037  0.837  -0.135  -1.467  0.260  0.581 
EVOL  -0.069  -0.888  -0.159  -0.680  -0.195  -0.252 
Adj. R
2  0.125    0.895    0.823   
OBS
  135    262    129   
 
** denotes 1% significance and * denotes 5% significance 
 
The table shows results from regressions of the 3-month basis on a lag of the basis, risk measures, the 
MBS-GC repo spread and the TED spread (Panel A) or the LIBOR-GC repo spread (Panel B).  Variable 
definitions are in Table 2.  The regression is estimated separately for the pre-crisis period (January 1, 
2007 – July 31 2007), the pre-Lehman period (August 1 2007 – September 15, 2008) and the post-
Lehman period (September 16 2008 – March 30 2009).  The standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure with the number of lags 
truncated at 5. 37 
 
Table 6: CIP Deviations and Relative Credit Risk of US versus Non-US Firms 
 
Panel A: Interest rate spread = TED spread 
  1/1/2007-7/31/2007  8/01/2007 - 9/15/2008  9/15/2008 - 3/31/2009 
Explanatory 
variable 
Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats 
MBS-GC  0.071*  1.909  -0.049**  -2.519  0.216**  2.674 
TED  0.007  1.321  0.024**  2.603  -0.133**  -3.583 
NUS-US 
CDS 
0.081*  1.774  -0.022*  -2.019  -0.248**  -4.189 
OTHER 
CONTROLS? 
YES    YES    YES   
Adj. R
2  0.127    0.894    0.855   
OBS
  135    264    128   
 
Panel B: Interest rate spread = LIBOR-GC spread 
  1/1/2007-7/31/2007  8/01/2007 - 9/15/2008  9/15/2008 - 3/31/2009 
Explanatory 
variable 
Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats 
MBS-GC  -0.008  -0.193  -0.055**  -2.999  0.215**  2.675 
LIB-GC  0.155**  3.191  0.034*  2.012  -0.132**  -3.270 
NUS-US 
CDS 
0.139**  3.203  -0.014  -1.260  -0.236**  -3.871 
OTHER 
CONTROLS? 
YES    YES    YES   
Adj. R
2  0.163    0.894    0.854   
OBS
  135    261    128   
 
** denotes 1% significance and * denotes 5% significance 
 
The table shows results from regressions of the 3-month basis on a lag of the basis, the relative credit risk 
of non-US versus US firms, the MBS-GC repo spread and the TED spread (Panel A) or the LIBOR-GC 
repo spread (Panel B).  OTHER CONTROLS are Par-OTR, Disp.,VIX and EVOL.  Variable definitions 
are in Table 2.  The regression is estimated separately for the pre-crisis period (January 1, 2007 – July 31 
2007), the pre-Lehman period (August 1 2007 – September 15, 2008) and the post-Lehman period 
(September 16 2008 – March 30 2009).  The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation using the Newey-West procedure with the number of lags truncated at 5. 38 
 
Table 7: Central Bank Currency Swap Announcements  
 
Dates  Announcement 
12/12 /2007 
Swap line arrangements with European Central Bank (ECB) 
and Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced. Agreement for 6 
months. 
1/10 /2008  ECB announces two TAF auctions for January 2008. 
2/01/2008  ECB announces it will not participate in February auctions. 
3/11/2008  Size of swap lines with ECB and SNB expanded. 
5/2/2008  Increased size of swap lines with ECB, SNB and extension of 
program.  Program extended till Jan 30 2009. 
7/30/2008  ECB, SNB announce establishment of 84 day TAF auctions. 
9/18/2008  Further expansion of swap lines with ECB and SNB. New 
swap line arrangements with Bank of Canada (BOC), Bank Of 
England (BOE), and Bank of Japan (BOJ). 
9/24/2008  New swap line arrangements with Royal Bank of Australia, 
Danmark Nationalbank, Norges Bank and Sweden Rijksbank. 
9/26/2008  Expanded swap line size with ECB, SNB announced. 
9/29/2008  Increased swap line sizes with ECB, SNB, BOC, BOE, BOJ, 
and Danmark Nationalbank, Norges Bank and Sweden 
Rijksbank. Agreements extended till April 30 2009. 
10/13/2008  Expansion of swap line sizes with ECB, SNB and BOE. 
10/14/2008  Expansion of swap line sizes with BOJ. 
10/28/2008  Initiate swap line arrangement with Royal Bank of New 
Zealand. 
10/29/2008  FED announces swap line arrangements with Banco Central 
do Brasil, Banco de Mexico, Bank of Korea, and the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore. 
02/03/2009  FED announces extension of swap line arrangements to 
October 30 2009 
 
The table shows dates of significant announcements of the Federal Reserve’s swap line arrangements with 
various international central banks between December 2007 and March 2009.39 
 
Table 8: Effect of Central Bank Currency Swaps on the Basis  
 
Panel A: Results using euro-dollar data at hourly frequency 
  5/23/2008 - 9/15/2008  9/16/2008 - 3/31/2009 
Explanatory 
variable 
Estimate  t-stats  Estimate  t-stats 
Intercept  -0.098  -0.285  -0.174  -0.114 
Swap ann.  -5.258**  -4.470  4.185  0.308 
$ auctions  -1.279  -1.685  -1.925  -0.644 
CONTROLS  YES    YES   
Adj. R
2  0.180    0.093   
OBS
  76    130   
 
Panel B: Results using euro-dollar data at daily frequency 
 
  8/1/2007-
5/22/2008 
5/23/2008-
9/15/2008 
9/16/2008-
3/30/2009 
Explanatory 
variable 
Est  t-stats  Est  t-stats  Est  t-stats 
Intercept  0.225  0.680  0.057  0.203  -0.168  -0.106 
Swap ann.  -0.917  -0.466  -2.982**  -4.796  -4.335  -0.506 
$ auction  -1.726  -1.630  -1.269  -1.242  3.741  0.980 
CONROLS?  YES    YES    YES   
Adj. R
2  -0.018    0.221    0.162   
OBS
  85    77    130   
** denotes 1% significance and * denotes 5% significance 
 
The table shows results from regressions of changes in the 3-month basis on dummy variables for SWAP 
announcements and dollar auction dates.  CONTROLS are changes in Disp., CDX, VIX, EVOL and 
Y10_3.  Variable definitions are in Table 2.  The regression is estimated separately for the pre-Lehman 
period (August 1 2007 – September 15, 2008) and the post-Lehman period (September 16 2008 – March 
30 2009).  The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using the Newey-
West procedure with the number of lags truncated at 5.   40 
Figure 1: CIP Deviations Based on US Dollar LIBOR and Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate January 
2007 –March 2009 
 
The figure plots estimates of Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP) deviations in US dollars (USD), 
calculated as the CIP implied USD rate minus the USD LIBOR rate.  The CIP implied USD rate is 
estimated using the euro-dollar exchange rate and the euro LIBOR rate.  The dashed line is based on daily 
exchange rate data and the solid line is based on hourly exchange rate data. The sample period is from 
January 1 2007 till March 30 2009 except for the hourly data which is available from May 23 2008.
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Figure 2: CIP Deviations Based on Dollar LIBOR, NYFR and Treasury Bill Rates, and the Euro-
Dollar Exchange Rate, January 2007 –March 2009 
 
The figure plots estimates of Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP) deviations in US dollars (USD), 
calculated as the CIP implied USD rate minus several benchmark USD rates.  The benchmark USD rates 
shown are the USD LIBOR rate (left axis), the NYFR rate (left axis) and the Treasury Bill rate (right 
axis).  The CIP implied rate USD is estimated using daily euro-dollar exchange rates and the euro LIBOR 
rate.  The sample period is from January 1 2007 till March 30 2009 except for the NYFR data which is 
available from May 30 2008.
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Figure 3: FX Basis Calculated For Different Currency Pairs, January 2007 –March 2009 
 
 
The figure plots estimates of Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP) deviations in US dollars (USD), 
calculated as the CIP implied USD rate minus the USD LIBOR rate.  The CIP implied USD rate is is 
estimated using exchange rates and interest rates denominated in the following currencies: the Australian 
dollar (AUD), the Swiss franc (CHF), the British pound (GBP), the Japanese Yen (JPY) and the New 
Zealand dollar (NZD).  The sample period is from January 1 2007 till March 30 2009 except for the USD-
AUD and the USD-NZD data that are available till December 31 2008.
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Figure 4: FX Basis, MBS-GC Repo Spread and TED Spread 
 
 
The figure plots estimates of Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP) deviations in US dollars (USD), 
calculated as the CIP implied USD rate minus the USD LIBOR rate.  The CIP implied USD rate is 
estimated using the euro-dollar exchange rate and the euro LIBOR rate.  Also plotted are the 3-month 
agency MBS minus GC repo spread and the 3-month TED spread (i.e. the LIBOR minus the Treasury bill 
rate). The sample period is from January 1 2007 till March 30 2009. 
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Figure 5: Spread between Average non-US and US USD LIBOR Quotes 
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